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Abstract. We study a two player zero-sum tug-of-war game with varying
probabilities that depend on the game location x. In particular, we show that
the value of the game is locally asymptotically Ho¨lder continuous. The main
difficulty is the loss of translation invariance. We also show the existence and
uniqueness of values of the game. As an application, we prove that the value
function of the game converges to a viscosity solution of the normalized p(x)-
Laplacian.
1. Introduction. The seminal works of Crandall, Evans, Ishii, Lions, Souganidis
and others established a connection between the stochastic differential games and
viscosity solution to Bellman-Isaacs equations in the early 80s. However, a similar
connection between the p-Laplace or∞-Laplace equations and the tug-of-war games
with noise was discovered only rather recently in [19, 20].
In this paper we study a tug-of-war with noise with space dependent probabilities,
which is a natural generalization of the original tug-of-war both from mathematical
and application point of views. In particular, we prove that the value functions of
the game in this setting are asymptotically Ho¨lder continuous, Theorem 4.1. Here
the main difficulty is the loss of translation invariance so that the global or local
regularity methods in [19], [16] or [12] are not directly applicable. Instead, we
employ the method in [11].
The main idea is to consider two game sequences simultaneously. Heuristically
speaking, in a higher dimensional space, the sequences can be linked to a single
higher dimensional game by introducing a probability measure that has the mea-
sures of the original game as marginals through suitable couplings. It is interesting
to note that couplings of stochastic processes can be employed in the study of regu-
larity for second order linear uniformly parabolic equations with continuous highest
order coefficients, see for example [14], [21], and [10]. The method has also some
similarities to the Ishii-Lions method [7], see also [18]. However, the method we use
does not rely on the theorem of sums in the theory of viscosity solutions nor does
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it use stochastic tools. Indeed, it applies directly to functions satisfying a dynamic
programming equation whether they arise from the stochastic games or numerical
methods to PDEs.
One of the key tools in studying the tug-of-war games is the dynamic program-
ming principle. For the game in this paper, the dynamic programming principle
(DPP) reads as
u(x) =
1− δ(x)
2
[
sup
|ν|=ε
(
α(x)u(x + ν) + β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
)
+ inf
|ν|=ε
(
α(x)u(x + ν) + β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
)]
+ δ(x)F (x)
(1)
with a given boundary cut-off function δ, a boundary function F and probability
functions α(x), β(x). Here, Bνε denotes the (n − 1)-dimensional ball orthogonal to
ν. For more details, see Section 2. Heuristic idea behind the DPP is that the
value at a point can be obtained by considering a single step in the game and
summing up all the possible outcomes. At the point x, the game continues with
a probability 1 − δ(x). In this case, the maximizer selects the direction νmax of
fixed radius maximizing the expected payoff at the point. Similarly, the minimizer
selects the direction νmin of the same radius minimizing the expectation. Then with
a probability α(x)/2, the game moves to x+ νmax in the single step, and with the
same probability, the game moves to x+ νmin. With a probability β(x)/2, the next
game point is x+ν′max, where ν
′
max is chosen according to the uniform distribution in
a (n− 1)-dimensional ball orthogonal to νmax. Similarly with the same probability,
the next game point is x + ν′min, where ν
′
min is chosen uniformly random from a
(n − 1)-dimensional ball orthogonal to νmin. If the game on the other hand stops
at x, the payoff is given by the boundary function F at the point.
The first step in the paper is to show that a value function satisfies the dynamic
programming principle above and that the value is unique. This is Theorem 3.7.
We first prove existence of a measurable function satisfying the DPP by iterating
the operator on the right hand side of (1). To this end, we guarantee the continuity
and thus Borel measurability of the iterands by the boundary correction in the DPP
above. Otherwise it is difficult to guarantee the measurability in such iterations.
Then, the uniqueness and the continuity of the solution is obtained by using game
theoretic arguments. In particular, we show that the solution coincides with the
game value.
As an application, by using the regularity result, Arzela`-Ascoli’s theorem and the
DPP, we show in Theorem 6.2 that the values of the game converge to a continuous
viscosity solution of the normalized p(x)-Laplace equation
∆Np(x)u(x) := ∆u(x) + (p(x) − 2)∆N∞u(x) = 0,
where ∆N∞u := |∇u|−2
∑n
i,j=1 uxixjuxiuxj is the normalized infinity Laplacian, and
p : Ω→ (1,∞) is a continuous function on the closure of the game domain Ω with
infΩ p > 1 and supΩ p < ∞. Observe that we cover the range 1 < p(x) < ∞.
To guarantee that the limit takes the same boundary values, we need boundary
estimates which are obtained in Theorem 5.2 by using barrier arguments.
2. Preliminaries. Fix n ≥ 2 and ε > 0 and let Ω ⊂ Rn be a bounded domain. For
measurability reasons, we need the boundary correction function δ in the dynamic
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programming principle. Thus, we define the following open sets
Iε = {x ∈ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) < ε},
Oε = {x ∈ Rn \ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) < ε}
and the set Ωε := Ω ∪Oε. The function δ : Ωε → [0, 1] is given by
δ(x) =

0 if x ∈ Ω \ Iε
1− ε−1 dist(x, ∂Ω) if x ∈ Iε
1 if x ∈ Oε.
Let p be a continuous function on Ω satisfying
1 < pmin := inf
x∈Ω
p(x) ≤ sup
x∈Ω
p(x) =: pmax <∞. (2)
We require the finite upper bound pmax to make sure that the tug-of-war game
defined below ends almost surely regardless of the strategies. Similarly, the upper
bound comes into a play in the techniques we use in Section 3.2. On the other
hand, the regularity and convergence results below require the lower bound in (2)
for the function p. To prove existence and uniqueness of continuous solutions to
(1) in Section 3, we utilize the uniform continuity of p. In Sections 4 and 5, the
regularity techniques do not require the continuity of p, but in Section 6, we apply
the continuity of p.
We define the functions α, β : Ω → (0, 1) depending on p(x) and the dimension
n by
α(x) =
p(x)− 1
p(x) + n
and β(x) = 1− α(x) = n+ 1
p(x) + n
.
By the assumptions on p(x), the functions α and β are uniformly continuous. In
addition, we have
αmax := sup
x∈Ω
α(x) < 1 and αmin := inf
x∈Ω
α(x) > 0. (3)
We also denote βmin := 1− αmax > 0.
We consider averages of the form
−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h) := 1Ln−1(Bνε )
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h),
where Ln−1 denotes the (n − 1)-dimensional Lebesgue measure. The open ball of
radius ε in the (n− 1)-dimensional hyperplane ν⊥ orthogonal to ν ∈ Rn is denoted
by Bνε , i.e.,
Bνε := Bε(0) ∩ ν⊥ := {z ∈ Rn : |z| < ε and 〈z, ν〉 = 0}.
Throughout the paper, we denote open n-dimensional balls of radius r > 0 by Br(x)
or by Br, if the center point x ∈ Rn plays no role.
For brevity, the compact boundary strip of the game domain is denoted by
Γε,ε := Iε ∪Oε.
Let F be a continuous boundary function F : Γε,ε → R. In addition, we define an
auxiliary function
W (x, ν) :=W (u;x, ν) := α(x)u(x + ν) + β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h) (4)
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and an operator
Tεu(x) :=
1− δ(x)
2
[
sup
|ν|=ε
(
W (u;x, ν)
)
+ inf
|ν|=ε
(
W (u;x, ν)
)]
+ δ(x)F (x) (5)
for all x ∈ Ωε and continuous functions u ∈ C(Ωε). By using this operator, we can
identify the solutions to (1) with the fixed points of Tε. Note that, despite the fact
that α(x) and β(x) are not defined in the outside strip Ωε \ Ω, (5) is well-defined
by setting Tεu(x) = F (x) for all x ∈ Ωε \ Ω. Similarly, we set δ(x)F (x) = 0 for all
x ∈ Ω \ Iε.
The same boundary correction as above is also applied in [6, 13]. For an alter-
native approach, see [2]. Here, this correction is used in order to preserve measura-
bility when iterating the operator. Indeed, in such iterations the measurability can
rather easily be lost, see for example [13, Example 2.4]. In addition, an asymptotic
expansion close to (1) is studied in [8].
2.1. The two-player tug-of-war game. In this subsection, we introduce the
stochastic zero-sum tug-of-war game used in this work. Most of the methods of this
paper arise from game theory, and some of the results are even directly proved by
using game theory arguments (for example the uniqueness proof in Theorem 3.6).
Let us consider a game involving two players (say PI and PII). A token is placed
at a starting point x0 ∈ Ω. Suppose that, after j = 0, 1, 2, . . . movements, the token
is at a point xj ∈ Ω. Then,
• if xj ∈ Ω \ Iε, PI and PII decide their possible movements νIj+1 and νIIj+1,
respectively, with
∣∣νIj+1∣∣ = ∣∣νIIj+1∣∣ = ε. A fair coin is tossed and if Pi wins the
toss, we have two possibilities
– with a probability α(xj), the token is moved to xj+1 = xj + ν
i
j+1, and
– with a probability β(xj), the token is moved to a point xj+1 ∈ xj +Bν
i
j+1
ε
uniformly random
with i ∈ {I, II}.
• If xj ∈ Iε ∪Oε,
– the game ends with a probability δ(xj) and then, PII pays PI the amount
given by F (xj), and
– with a probability 1 − δ(xj), the players play a game as in the previous
case xj ∈ Ω \ Iε.
Let τ denote the time when the game ends, and denote by xτ ∈ Γε,ε the position
where the game ends. Then, PII pays PI the quantity F (xτ ).
We can construct the game described above by the following procedure. Let
(cj)
∞
j=0 be a sequence of random variables such that cj ∈ {0, 1} =: C˜ for all j ≥
0 with c0 := 0. The random variable cj gives the information whether the jth
movement of the game has been decided by playing the game. If it holds cj = 0, the
position xj is selected by playing the game. On the other hand, if it holds cj = 1,
we have xj = xj−1.
Let ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, . . . be independent and identically distributed random variables
such that ξ0 is distributed uniformly random on [0, 1]. Moreover, the process (ξj)
∞
j=0
is independent of the game process (xj)
∞
j=0. Then for all j ≥ 1, the probability
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distribution of the random variable cj is determined by
cj =
{
0, if ξj−1 ≤ 1− δ(xj−1),
1, if ξj−1 > 1− δ(xj−1)
given that it holds cj−1 = 0. If it holds cj−1 = 1, then we have cj = 1. By this
definition of cj for all j ≥ 1, we can define the random variable τ by
τ = inf
j≥0
{
cj+1 = 1
}
. (6)
We define a history of the game as the vector
(
(c0, x0), (c1, x1), . . . , (cj , xj)
)
de-
scribing the positions of the token and the information whether the positions had
been taken by playing the game at each step after j repetitions. A strategy is a
sequence of Borel measurable functions that gives the next game position given the
history of the game. Therefore, we define Si := (Sji )∞j=1 with
Sji :
{
(c0, x0)
}× j−1⋃
k=1
(C˜ × Ωε)k → ∂Bε(0)
for all j ∈ N and with both i ∈ {I, II}. For example, we have for PI and for all j ≥ 1
that
SjI
((
(c0, x0), . . . , (cj−1, xj−1)
))
= νIj ∈ ∂Bε(0).
Given a starting point x0 ∈ Ω and strategies SI,SII, we define a probability mea-
sure Px0SI,SII on the natural product σ-algebra of the space of all game trajectories.
This measure is built by applying Kolmogorov’s extension theorem to the family of
transition densities
πSI,SII
(
(c0, x0), (c1, x1), . . . , (cj , xj);C,A
)
=
(
1− δ(xj)
)
πlocalSI,SII
(
(x0, x1, . . . , xj);A
)
I0(C)Icj
({0})
+ δ(xj)Ixj (A)I1(C)Icj
({0})+ Icj({1})Ixj (A)
for all Borel subsets A ⊂ Rn and C ⊂ C˜. With a slight abuse of the notation, for
all points z and sets B, the measure Iz(B) is one, if z ∈ B, and zero otherwise.
Moreover, it holds
πlocalSI,SII
(
(x0, . . . , xj);A
)
=
1
2
[
α(xj)
(
Ixj+νIj+1
(A) + Ixj+νIIj+1 (A)
)
+
β(xj)
ωn−1εn−1
(
Ln−1
(
B
νIj+1
ε (xj) ∩ A
)
+ Ln−1
(
B
νIIj+1
ε (xj) ∩ A
))]
with the constant ωn−1 := Ln−1
(
Bz1
)
for any z ∈ Rn \ {0}. Furthermore, we denote
Bzε (y) := y +B
z
ε for z ∈ Rn \ {0} and y ∈ Rn.
Here, we follow the ideas from [6], where the constant α case is covered. For
the benefit of the reader and since the setting is slightly different, we give a self-
contained proof.
Lemma 2.1. The game ends almost surely in finite time regardless of the strategies
SI and SII.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to consider solely random movements and to find a
uniform lower bound for the probability of the event that the modulus of |xj | grows
in a suitable fashion. In the proof, we need the fact βmin > 0.
6 A´. ARROYO, J. HEINO AND M. PARVIAINEN
Let x0 ∈ Ω, j ≥ 0 and let xj+1 = xj + hj , where hj represents the displacement
at each step of the game. By the vector calculus, we have
|xj+1|2 = |xj |2 + |hj |2 + 2〈xj , hj〉.
In addition by the definition of the game, hj is randomly chosen from B
ν
ε with
a probability β(xj)/2 for the vector ν := ν
I
j+1. Moreover, given that a random
movement is chosen from Bνε , we have 〈xj , hj〉 ≥ 0 with a probability of at least 12
and the event |hj | ≥ ε2 has a probability of
1−
Ln−1(Bνε/2)
Ln−1(Bνε ) = 1− 21−n.
Consequently, there is a positive probability of a random movement hj such that
|hj| ≥ ε/2 and 〈xj , hj〉 ≥ 0. In this case, we have
|xj+1|2 ≥ |xj |2 + ε
2
4
(7)
with a probability of at least
β(xj)
(
1
4
− 1
2n+1
)
≥ βmin
(
1
4
− 1
2n+1
)
=: θ > 0.
Note that the universal constant θ does not depend on j and the fact βmin > 0
implies θ > 0. Now, let
j0 := j0(ε,Ω) = 4
⌈
diam(Ω)ε−2
⌉ ∈ N.
Then, after j0 consecutive movements in the way (7) we have
|xj0 |2 ≥ |x0|2 + j0
ε2
4
> |x0|2 + diam(Ω).
Therefore, the token has exited the game domain after at most j0 steps for any
starting point x0 with a probability of at least θ
j0 . Consequently, the probability
of not exiting the game domain after j0 steps is bounded above by 1− θj0 .
By repeating kj0 times the game, the probability of not exiting Ω after kj0 steps
is bounded above by (
1− θj0)k .
Thus, by letting k →∞, this probability goes to zero, and the proof is completed.
For all starting points x0 ∈ Ω, we define a value function for PI and for PII by
uI(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )],
uII(x0) = inf
SII
sup
SI
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )].
(8)
3. Existence and uniqueness. In this section, the goal is to prove that there
exists a unique continuous solution satisfying the dynamic programming principle
(1). The proof is divided into two parts. In Section 3.1, by iterating the operator
Tε defined in (5), we show that there exist a lower and an upper semicontinuous
solution to (1). Then in Section 3.2, we show that every measurable solution to
(1) is bounded between the lower and the upper semicontinuous solutions. Further,
we prove by using the tug-of-war game defined in Section 2.1 that, in fact, both
semicontinuous solutions are the same.
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3.1. Existence of semicontinuous solutions to (1). In this subsection, by it-
erating the operator Tε, we construct monotone sequences of bounded continuous
functions. As a consequence, these sequences converge to semicontinuous functions
which turn out to be solutions to (1). With that purpose, first, we need to show
that Tε maps continuous functions into continuous functions.
Lemma 3.1. For any continuous function u ∈ C(Ωε), the function W (x, ν) defined
in (4) is continuous with respect to each variable on Ω× ∂Bε(0).
Proof. For fixed |ν| = ε, we have for any x, y ∈ Ω the estimate
|α(x)u(x + ν)− α(y)u(y + ν)|
≤ |α(x)u(x + ν)− α(x)u(y + ν)|+ |α(x)u(y + ν)− α(y)u(y + ν)|
≤ α(x)ωu(|x− y|) + ‖u‖∞ ωα(|x− y|),
where ωf is a modulus of continuity of the uniformly continuous function f . In a
similar way, we have∣∣∣∣∣β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)− β(y)−
∫
Bνε
u(y + h)dLn−1(h)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ β(x)ωu(|x− y|) + ‖u‖∞ ωβ(|x− y|)
for x, y ∈ Ω. Thus, these inequalities imply that
|W (x, ν) −W (y, ν)| ≤ ωu(|x− y|) + ‖u‖∞
[
ωα(|x− y|) + ωβ(|x− y|)
]
(9)
for all x, y ∈ Ω. Hence, W (·, ν) is a continuous function for fixed ν with modulus
of continuity ωu + ‖u‖∞
[
ωα + ωβ
]
.
For the continuity on ν, fix a point x ∈ Ω. Then, the modulus of continuity of
α does not play any role. In addition, since the function u is continuous by the
hypothesis, we only need to check the continuity of the function
ν 7→ −
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h).
Let |ν| = |χ| = ε and define a rotation P : ν⊥ → χ⊥ satisfying
|h− Ph| ≤ C |h| |ν − χ| (10)
for all h ∈ ν⊥, where C > 0 is a constant not depending on the choices of ν and χ.
Therefore, we have
−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)−−
∫
Bχε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
= −
∫
Bνε
[u(x+ h)− u(x+ Ph)] dLn−1(h). (11)
By recalling (10) together with the fact that we can choose ωu to be increasing, we
can estimate the expression in brackets in the equation (11) from above by
ωu (Cε |ν − χ|)
for h ∈ Bνε . Then, this same bound also holds for (11), and the continuity ofW (x, ·)
for fixed x ∈ Ω follows.
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Lemma 3.2. For all u ∈ C(Ωε), the operator Tε defined in (5) satisfies Tεu ∈
C(Ωε). In addition, for all u, v ∈ C(Ωε) such that u ≤ v, we have
Tεu ≤ Tεv (monotonicity).
Proof. The monotonicity of Tε follows easily from the definition (5). Let u ∈ C(Ωε)
be a function with a modulus of continuity ωu. By (5) and the fact that F is
continuous on Oε, the function Tεu is continuous on the outside strip Oε. Thus, we
have to check that Tεu is continuous on Ω.
First, let x, y ∈ Ω \ Iε and recall the elementary inequalities∣∣∣∣∣ sup|ν|=εW (x, ν) − sup|ν|=εW (y, ν)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup|ν|=ε |W (x, ν) −W (y, ν)| ,∣∣∣∣ inf|ν|=εW (x, ν) − inf|ν|=εW (y, ν)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
|ν|=ε
|W (x, ν) −W (y, ν)| .
Then by the inequality (9) for any |ν| = ε, we get that
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
(
sup
|ν|=ε
+ inf
|ν|=ε
)
W (x, ν) −
(
sup
|ν|=ε
+ inf
|ν|=ε
)
W (y, ν)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ωu(|x− y|) + ‖u‖∞
[
ωα(|x− y|) + ωβ(|x− y|)
]
.
Here, we use the shorthand notation(
sup
|ν|=ε
+ inf
|ν|=ε
)
W (x, ν) := sup
|ν|=ε
W (x, ν) + inf
|ν|=ε
W (x, ν).
Therefore, since δ = 0 on Ω \ Iε, we have shown that Tεu is continuous on Ω \ Iε.
Then, let x, y ∈ Iε and recall that supx∈Ω
(
1 − δ(x)) = 1 and ωδ(t) = t/ε for
t ≥ 0. Thus, we can estimate∣∣∣∣∣1− δ(x)2
(
sup
|ν|=ε
+ inf
|ν|=ε
)
W (x, ν) − 1− δ(y)
2
(
sup
|ν|=ε
+ inf
|ν|=ε
)
W (y, ν)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ωu(|x− y|) + ‖u‖∞
[
ωα(|x− y|) + ωβ(|x− y|)
]
+
‖u‖∞
ε
|x− y|
and
|δ(x)F (x) − δ(y)F (y)| ≤ δ(x)ωF (|x− y|) + ‖F‖∞
ε
|x− y| .
Consequently, Tεu is continuous in Iε. Since the limiting values of the function Tεu
coincide with the function values on the boundary ∂Iε, there must exist a modulus
of continuity for Tεu, and hence Tεu ∈ C(Ωε).
For the next result, let T kε denote the k-th iteration of the operator Tε for k ∈ N,
i.e.,
T kε = Tε(T
k−1
ε ), T
0
ε = Id,
with the identity operator Id(u) = u for all u ∈ C(Ωε). By (5) and the monotonic-
ity of Tε, the sequence of iterates
{
T kε (inf F )
}
k
is increasing and
{
T kε (supF )
}
k
is
decreasing. Moreover,
inf F ≤ T kε (inf F ) ≤ T kε (supF ) ≤ supF (12)
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for all k ∈ N. Consequently, we can define the pointwise limit of both sequences{
u(x) := lim
k→∞
T kε (inf F ),
u(x) := lim
k→∞
T kε (supF )
(13)
for all x ∈ Ωε. In addition, since u and u are defined as the limit of monotone se-
quences of continuous functions, they are lower and upper semicontinuous functions,
respectively.
Proposition 3.3. The functions u and u defined in (13) are solutions to (1) and
satisfy
u ≤ u. (14)
Proof. The inequality (14) follows easily from (12). We only show that u is a
solution to (1), since a similar argument can be applied to u. To establish the
result, we use Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 and the fact that {T kε (inf F )} is increasing to
show that we can change the order of the limit and the infimum in the function u.
Let x ∈ Ωε and uk := T kε (inf F ) for k ∈ N. Then,
u(x) = lim
k→∞
uk+1(x) = lim
k→∞
Tεuk(x)
=
1− δ(x)
2
[
lim
k→∞
sup
|ν|=ε
W (uk;x, ν) + lim
k→∞
inf
|ν|=ε
W (uk;x, ν)
]
+ δ(x)F (x),
where W denotes the auxiliary function defined in (4). Thus, we need to prove the
equalities
lim
k→∞
sup
|ν|=ε
W (uk;x, ν) = sup
|ν|=ε
W (u;x, ν)
and
lim
k→∞
inf
|ν|=ε
W (uk;x, ν) = inf
|ν|=ε
W (u;x, ν).
The first equation follows from the fact that the sequence {uk} is pointwise increas-
ing. For the second equation, we can assume x ∈ Ω. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 imply
that W (uk;x, ν) is continuous with respect to ν for all k ≥ 1. Therefore, we can
define the compact set
Ck(λ) := {ν ∈ Rn : |ν| = ε and W (uk;x, ν) ≤ λ}
for λ ∈ R. Again, since {uk} is pointwise increasing, Ck+1(λ) ⊂ Ck(λ) for all k ≥ 1.
Now, let
λ = lim
k→∞
inf
|ν|=ε
W (uk;x, ν).
Because W (uk;x, ·) is continuous for all k ≥ 1, there exists ν∗k ∈ ∂Bε(0) such that
inf
|ν|=ε
W (uk;x, ν) =W (uk;x, ν
∗
k).
This, together with the fact that {uk} is increasing, yields Ck(λ) 6= ∅ for all k ≥ 1.
Thus by Cantor’s intersection theorem, we get
∞⋂
k=1
Ck(λ) 6= ∅.
Choose ν˜ ∈ ∩∞k=1Ck(λ) so that we can estimate
λ ≤ inf
|ν|=ε
W (u;x, ν) ≤W (u;x, ν˜) = lim
k→∞
W (uk;x, ν˜) ≤ λ.
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The first inequality follows from the choice of λ and the fact that {uk} is increasing.
In addition, we use the monotone convergence theorem in the first equality and the
choice of ν˜ in the last inequality. Therefore, the proof is complete.
3.2. Uniqueness of solutions to (1). In this subsection, we prove the uniqueness
of solutions to (1). To establish the result, we first show that any measurable
solution of the equation (1) is between the solutions u and u. Then, we show that,
in fact, the functions u and u coincide. For the first result, we need the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let u be a measurable solution to (1). Assume that supF < supΩ u,
and let x ∈ Ω be such that
u(x) > max
{
supF, sup
Ω
u− λ
}
(15)
for λ > 0. Then, there exist |ν0| = ε and h0 ∈ Bν0ε satisfying the inequalities
|x+ h0|2 ≥ |x|2 + 2 21−n ε2 (16)
and
u(x+ h0) ≥ sup
Ω
u− c(α)λ (17)
with a constant c(α) > 1.
Proof. We obtain the inequalities (16) and (17) by analyzing the dynamic program-
ming principle (1). The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1. Since u satisfies
(1), we have
u(x) ≤ (1− δ(x)) sup
|ν|=ε
(
α(x)u(x + ν) + β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
)
+ δ(x) supF
≤ (1− δ(x))α(x) sup
|ν|=ε
u(x+ ν) + (1− δ(x))β(x) sup
|ν|=ε
−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
+ δ(x) supF.
In addition, by utilizing the assumption (15) and u = F on Oε, we get
sup
|ν|=ε
u(x+ ν) ≤ u(x) + λ.
Thus by (15), 0 < δ(x) < 1, α(x) + β(x) = 1 and β(x) ≥ βmin > 0 for all x ∈ Ω, we
have
u(x) ≤ sup
|ν|=ε
−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h) + αmax
βmin
λ.
By the definition of supremum, there must exist |ν0| = ε such that
u(x)− 2αmax
βmin
λ ≤ −
∫
B
ν0
ε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h). (18)
Next, we define a set S ⊂ Bν0ε depending on x and ν0. If x 6= 0 and ν0 ∈ span{x}
or x = 0, we define
S :=
{
h ∈ Bν0ε : |h| ≥ (3/4)
1
n−1 ε
}
.
Otherwise, we set
S :=
{
h ∈ Bν0ε : |h| ≥ 2
1
1−n ε and 〈x, h〉 ≥ 0
}
.
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Observe that in both cases, the Lebesgue measure of the set S is the same. Indeed,
it is clear that
Ln−1(Bν0ε )− Ln−1(Bν0(3/4)1/(n−1)ε) =
1
4
Ln−1(Bν0ε ).
By symmetry, we get
Ln−1({h ∈ Bν0ε : 〈x, h〉 > 0}) = Ln−1({h ∈ Bν0ε : 〈x, h〉 < 0}),
and in the case x 6= 0 and ν0 6∈ span{x}, it holds
Ln−1({h ∈ Bν0ε : 〈x, h〉 = 0}) = 0.
Thus, we have
Ln−1(S) = 1
4
Ln−1(Bν0ε ). (19)
In addition, because (3/4)
2
n−1 ≥ 2 21−n , the inequality (16) holds for each h ∈ S.
The equality (19), together with (15) and (18), implies
sup
Ω
u ≤ u(x) + λ
≤ −
∫
B
ν0
ε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h) + λ1 + αmax
βmin
=
1
4Ln−1(S)
{∫
S
u(x+h)dLn−1(h)+
∫
B
ν0
ε \S
u(x+h)dLn−1(h)
}
+λ
1+αmax
βmin
≤ 1
4
−
∫
S
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h) + 3
4
sup
Ω
u+
2λ
βmin
.
By rearranging the terms and multiplying by 4, we have
sup
Ω
u− 8λ
βmin
≤ −
∫
S
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h).
Hence, there must exist h0 ∈ S ⊂ Bν0ε satisfying (17).
Proposition 3.5. Any measurable solution u to (1) satisfies
u ≤ u ≤ u
with u and u the semicontinuous functions defined in (13).
Proof. By the monotonicity of the operator Tε and the definitions of u and u, it is
enough to show that
inf F ≤ u ≤ supF. (20)
Because u is a solution to (1), we have u(x) = F (x) for x ∈ Oε. Hence, we
need to show the estimate (20) for all x ∈ Ω. We focus our attention on the
second inequality, since the proof of the first inequality is analogous. We proceed
by contradiction and assume that
sup
Ω
u > supF.
By the assumption, for η > 0 there exists a point x1 ∈ Ω such that
u(x1) > max
{
supF, sup
Ω
u− η
}
.
The idea of the proof consists of finding a sequence of points {xj} satisfying
u(xj) > supF for all j and |xj0 | is big enough for some large j0 ≥ 1. This is a
12 A´. ARROYO, J. HEINO AND M. PARVIAINEN
contradiction, because u = F on Oε. We obtain the sequence of points by using
Lemma 3.4 iteratively.
Choose an integer j0 := j0(ε, n,Ω) ≥ 1 big enough such that
j2
2
1−n ε2 > diam(Ω) (21)
for all j ≥ j0. Then, we fix the constant η > 0 small enough such that
0 < η <
1
c(α)j0
(
sup
Ω
u− supF
)
(22)
with the constant c(α) > 1 from Lemma 3.4. We start from x1 and choose x2
such that x2 = x1 + h0 with h0 given by Lemma 3.4. Then, we have that |x2|2 ≥
|x1|2 + 2 21−n ε2 and
u(x2) ≥ sup
Ω
u− c(α)η > supF.
If x2 ∈ Oε, we get a contradiction. Otherwise, we continue in the same way. We
choose x3 such that x3 = x2+ h1 with h1 given by Lemma 3.4. Then, we have that
|x3|2 ≥ |x1|2 + 2 · 2 21−n ε2 and
u(x3) ≥ sup
Ω
u− c(α)2η > supF.
After j0 − 1 repetitions, assume that xj0 ∈ Ω. By the inequalities (21) and (22)
it holds for the point xj0+1 that
|xj0+1|2 ≥ |x1|2 + j02
2
1−n ε2 > |x1|2 + diam(Ω)
and
u(xj0+1) ≥ sup
Ω
u− c(α)j0η > supF.
Since xj0+1 6∈ Ω, the contradiction follows.
The next theorem, together with (14), implies that the semicontinuous solutions
to (1), u and u, coincide.
Theorem 3.6. Let u and u be the semicontinuous functions defined in (13). In
addition, let uI and uII be the value functions defined in (8). Then, we have that
u ≤ uI ≤ uII ≤ u.
Proof. From the properties of inf and sup, it is clear that
uI ≤ uII.
Thus, we need to prove that
uII ≤ u and u ≤ uI.
We only show uII ≤ u, since the argument in the other case is similar. To
establish the result, we find a suitable strategy for PII and a function (c, x) 7→ Φ(c, x)
depending on u and F such that the process Φ(ck, xk) becomes a supermartingale
irregardless what the opponent does. Then, we will be able to compare the functions
u and uII by the optimal stopping theorem.
Let x0 ∈ Ω and denote a strategy S∗II for PII such that
W (u;xj , ν
II
j ) = inf
|ν|=ε
W (u;xj , ν)
for all j ≥ 0, where W denotes the auxiliary function defined in (4). By a measure
theoretical analysis, we can prove that this strategy is Borel measurable. For more
details, see for example [22, Theorem 5.3.1].
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Fix any strategy SI for PI, and let us define a function Φ : C˜×Rn → R such that
Φ(c, x) =
{
u(x), if c = 0,
F (x), if c = 1.
Then, we can estimate
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
Φ(cj+1, xj+1)
∣∣((c0, x0), . . . , (cj , xj))]
=
(
1− δ(xj)
2
[
W (u;xj , ν
I
j+1) +W (u;xj , ν
II
j+1)
]
+ δ(xj)F (xj)
)
Icj
({0})
+ F (xj)Icj
({1})
≤
(
1− δ(xj)
2
[
sup
|ν|=ε
W (u;xj , ν) + inf
|ν|=ε
W (u;xj , ν)
]
+ δ(xj)F (xj)
)
Icj
({0})
+ F (xj)Icj
({1}).
Since u is a solution to (1), we have by this estimate
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
Φ(cj+1, xj+1)
∣∣((c0, x0), . . . , (cj , xj))] ≤ Φ(cj , xj)
for all j ≥ 0. Thus, the stochastic process (Φ(ck, xk))∞k=0 is a supermartingale,
when PII uses the strategy S∗II. By recalling (6), and since F is bounded, we get by
using the optional stopping theorem that
uII(x0) = inf
SII
sup
SI
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ )
]
≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
F (xτ )
]
= sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
Φ(cτ+1, xτ+1)
]
≤ u(x0),
because it holds c0 = 0. Therefore, the proof is complete.
Now, Theorem 3.6 and Proposition 3.5 imply the uniqueness of solutions to (1).
In addition, this unique function is continuous and the value function of the game.
Theorem 3.7. Let ε > 0 and let F : Γε,ε → Rn be a continuous function. Then,
there exists a continuous function uε : Ωε → Rn with the boundary data F such
that it satisfies the dynamic programming principle (1). Moreover, this function is
unique and it is the value function of the game, i.e., uε = uI = uII with uI and uII
defined in (8).
4. Local regularity. In this section, we give a local regularity estimate for func-
tions satisfying (1) in Ω \ Iε. The dynamic programming principle in Ω \ Iε reduces
to the equation
u(x) =
1
2
[
sup
|ν|=ε
(
α(x)u(x + ν) + β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
)
+ inf
|ν|=ε
(
α(x)u(x + ν) + β(x)−
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h)dLn−1(h)
)]
.
(23)
The regularity result is based on a method established by Luiro and Parviainen in
[11]. The method consists of several steps. First, we choose a comparison function
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f having the desired regularity properties. Then, the idea is to analyze two different
cases separately. At a small scale, we need to control the effects arising from the
discretization. At a bigger scale, the key term of the comparison function is C|x−z|γ
with x, z ∈ Rn, 0 < γ < 1 and C > 0 big enough.
In the second step, we aim to prove that the error u(x)−u(z)− f(x, z), where u
is the solution to (23), is smaller in (B1×B1) \T than in (B2×B2) \ (B1×B1 \T )
with both sets belonging to R2n. The set T is the set of points (x, z) ∈ R2n such
that x = z. Then, we thrive for a contradiction by assuming that the error is bigger
in (B1 ×B1) \ T .
As a final step, we get a contradiction by using a multidimensional dynamic
programming principle for the comparison function f . In the proof below, intuition
based on suitable strategies is helpful even though we do not write down stochastic
arguments.
Theorem 4.1. Let (x, z) ∈ BR ×BR, B2R ⊂ Ω and
0 < γ <
αmin
αmax
− κ (24)
for arbitrary small κ ∈ (0, αmin/αmax) with αmin, αmax defined in (3). Then, if u
satisfies (23), we have
|u(x)− u(z)| ≤ C |x− z|
γ
Rγ
+ C
εγ
Rγ
(25)
with C := C(pmin, pmax, n, R, supB2R u, γ), 0 < ε < 1 and pmin, pmax defined in (2).
Proof. By using a scaling x 7→ Rx, we can assume that R = 1. In addition by
translation, it is enough to consider the claim (25) in the case z = −x. For simplicity,
we assume supB2×B2(u(x)− u(z)) ≤ 1.
Given C > 1, let N ∈ N be such that
N ≥ 10
2C
γ
.
Then, we define the following functions in R2n
f1(x, z) = C |x− z|γ + |x+ z|2 ,
f2(x, z) =
{
C2(N−i)εγ if (x, z) ∈ Ai,
0 if |x− z| > N ε
10
,
f(x, z) = f1(x, z)− f2(x, z)
with Ai =
{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : (i− 1) ε
10
< |x− z| ≤ i ε
10
}
for i = 0, 1, . . . , N . The
function f2 is called an annular step function, and it is needed to control the small
scale jumps. Note that we have sup f2 = C
2Nεγ reached on
T := A0 =
{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : x = z} .
It holds that f1 ≥ 1 in (B2 × B2) \ (B1 × B1). Here, we need the term |x + z|2
in the function f1, because
|x+ z|2 = 2|x|2 + 2|z|2 − |x− z|2 ≥ 3
for all x, z ∈ (B2 ×B2) \ (B1 ×B1) such that |x− z| ≤ 1. Therefore, together with
u(x)− u(z) ≤ 1 in B2 ×B2 and u(x)− u(z) = 0 in T we have
u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z) ≤ sup f2 = C2Nεγ , (26)
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if (x, z) ∈ T or (x, z) ∈ (B2×B2) \ (B1×B1). We have to show that this inequality
is also true in (B1 ×B1) \ T . Thriving for a contradiction, write
M := sup
(x,z)∈B1×B1\T
(u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z))
and suppose that
M > C2Nεγ .
By (26), this is equivalent to
M = sup
(x,z)∈B2×B2
(u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z)). (27)
For all η > 0, we choose a pair of points (x, z) ∈ (B1 ×B1) \ T such that
M ≤ u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z) + η
2
. (28)
Then by (23), we have
u(x)− u(z) ≤ 1
2
sup
νx,νz
(W (x, νx)−W (z, νz)) + 1
2
inf
νx,νz
(W (x, νx)−W (z, νz)), (29)
where W is the auxiliary function defined in (4).
Given |νx| = |νz| = ε, let Pνz ,−νx denote any rotation that sends νz to −νx. By
recalling α(x) + β(x) = 1 for x ∈ Ω, we can decompose the difference W (x, νx) −
W (z, νz). For simplicity, we may assume that α(x) ≥ α(z). Thus, we get
W (x, νx)−W (z, νz) = α(z) [u(x+ νx)− u(z + νz)]
+ β(x)−
∫
Bνzε
[u(x+ Pνz ,−νxh)− u(z + h)] dLn−1(h)
+ (α(x) − α(z))
[
u(x+ νx)−−
∫
Bνzε
u(z + h)dLn−1(h)
]
.
(30)
Next, we use the counter assumption (27) to estimate each of the terms in (30) from
above. Consequently, we can estimate
u(y)− u(y˜) ≤M + f(y, y˜)
for all y, y˜ ∈ B2. Then, we define
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) := α(z)f(x+ νx, z + νz)
+ β(x)−
∫
Bνzε
f(x+ Pνz ,−νxh, z + h)dLn−1(h)
+ (α(x) − α(z))−
∫
Bνzε
f(x+ νx, z + h)dLn−1(h).
(31)
Thus, we have
W (x, νx)−W (z, νz) ≤M +G(f, x, z, νx, νz). (32)
By taking the supremum, we obtain
sup
νx,νz
(W (x, νx)−W (z, νz)) ≤M + sup
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz). (33)
On the other hand, choose |̺x| = |̺z| = ε such that
inf
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) ≥ G(f, x, z, ̺x, ̺z)− η.
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This together with (32) yields
inf
νx,νz
(W (x, νx)−W (z, νz)) ≤W (x, ̺x)−W (z, ̺z)
≤M +G(f, x, z, ̺x, ̺z)
≤M + inf
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) + η.
Therefore, by applying this inequality and (33) to (29) we get
u(x)− u(z) ≤M + 1
2
[
sup
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) + inf
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz)
]
+
η
2
.
Combining this with (28), we need to show
sup
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) + inf
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) < 2f(x, z).
This inequality follows from Proposition 4.2 below. Consequently, the equation (26)
holds in B2 ×B2.
Proposition 4.2. Let f and T be as at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 4.1,
and fix x, z ∈ B1 × B1 \ T . In addition, let G be as in (31). Then, it holds that
sup
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) + inf
νx,νz
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) < 2f(x, z).
The main part of the section is to show this estimate for G. This is done in
several steps below.
4.1. Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let V ⊂ Rn be the space spanned by x− z 6= 0.
We denote the orthogonal complement of V by V ⊥, i.e.,
V ⊥ = {y ∈ Rn : 〈y, x− z〉 = 0} .
Given any y ∈ Rn, we can decompose y = yV (x− z)/|x− z|+ yV⊥ , where yV ∈ R is
the scalar projection of y onto V and yV ⊥ ∈ V ⊥, respectively. For the decomposed
point it holds
yV = 〈y, x− z|x− z| 〉,
|yV ⊥ | =
√
|y|2 − y2V .
By using this notation, the second order Taylor’s expansion of f1 is
f1(x+ hx, z + hz)− f1(x, z)
= Cγ |x− z|γ−1 (hx − hz)V + 2〈x+ z, hx + hz〉
+
1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2
{
(γ − 1)(hx − hz)2V + |(hx − hz)V ⊥ |2
}
+ |hx + hz|2 + Ex,z(hx, hz),
(34)
where Ex,z(hx, hz) is the error term. In the above, we used the calculations
〈∇f1(x, z), (hTx , hTz )〉 = Cγ|x− z|γ−2〈x− z, hx − hz〉+ 2〈x+ z, hx + hz〉
and
D2f1 =
[
A −A
−A A
]
+ 2
[
I I
I I
]
with
A := Cγ|x− z|γ−2
[
(γ − 2) x− z|x− z| ⊗
x− z
|x− z| + I
]
.
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The matrix I stands for the n×n identity matrix, and we denote the tensor product
of two vectors by ⊗, i.e., h ⊗ s := hsT for vectors h, s ∈ Rn. By recalling the
elementary formula hT (s⊗ s)h = 〈h, s〉2 for all h, s ∈ Rn, we get (34).
By Taylor’s theorem, the error term satisfies
|Ex,z(hx, hz)| ≤ C
∣∣(hTx , hTz )∣∣3 (|x− z| − 2ε)γ−3,
if |x− z| > 2ε. With the choice N ≥ 100Cγ and if |x− z| > N10ε, we can estimate
|Ex,z(hx, hz)| ≤ C(2ε)3
( |x− z|
2
)γ−3
≤ 64Cε2|x− z|γ−2 ε|x− z|
≤ 10 |x− z|γ−2 ε2,
(35)
because |hx| , |hz| ≤ ε. Therefore, to prove the result, we distinguish two separate
cases. In the first case, we have |x− z| ≤ N10ε and in the second case, we have
|x− z| > N10ε.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Case |x− z| ≤ N ε10 . In this case, we do not utilize the
formula (34). We use concavity and convexity estimates for the terms in f1 and the
properties of the annular step function f2. For x, z ∈ B1 and |hx| , |hz| < ε < 1, it
holds
|f1(x+ hx, z + hz)− f1(x, z)| ≤ 2Cεγ + 16ε ≤ 3Cεγ
for C > 16. Consequently by (31), we have
sup
hx,hz
G(f1, x, z, hx, hz) ≤ f1(x, z) + 3Cεγ .
Together with f2 ≥ 0, these estimates yield
sup
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz) ≤ f1(x, z) + 3Cεγ . (36)
Find i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} such that (i − 1) ε10 < |x− z| ≤ i ε10 and choose |νx| , |νz| < ε
such that (x+ νx, z + νz) ∈ Ai−1. Then for C > 1 large enough, we can estimate
sup
hx,hz
G(f2, x, z, hx, hz) ≥ G(f2, x, z, νx, νz)
≥ α(z)f2(x+ νx, z + νz)
= α(z)C2(N−i+1)εγ
= α(z)
(
C2 − 2
α(z)
)
C2(N−i)εγ + 2f2(x, z)
> 6Cεγ + 2f2(x, z),
where we use f2 ≥ 0 in the second inequality and α(z) > αmin > 0 for all z ∈ Ω in
the last inequality. Therefore, by f = f1 − f2 and (36) it holds
inf
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz) ≤ sup
hx,hz
G(f1, x, z, hx, hz)− sup
hx,hz
G(f2, x, z, hx, hz))
≤ f1(x, z)− 2f2(x, z)− 3Cεγ .
Combining this inequality with (36), we get
sup
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz) + inf
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz) < 2f(x, z).
Hence, the proof of the case is complete.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2: Case |x− z| > N ε10 . In this case, f2(x, z) = 0 and hence
f ≡ f1. We apply (34) to get the result. For η > 0, let νx, νz be such that
sup
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz) ≤ G(f, x, z, νx, νz) + η.
Therefore for any |̺x| , |̺z| ≤ ε, we get the following inequality
sup
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz) + inf
hx,hz
G(f, x, z, hx, hz)
≤ G(f, x, z, νx, νz) +G(f, x, z, ̺x, ̺z) + η.
(37)
By (35) and |hx| , |hz| ≤ ε, the last two terms in (34) are bounded above by
(4 + 10 |x− z|γ−2)ε2.
We denote
E := E(f, x, z, γ, ε) := f(x, z) + (4 + 10 |x− z|γ−2)ε2,
and recall the notation Ph,s denoting the rotation sending h to s for any vectors
|h| = |s| in Rn. By (37) and (31), it suffices to study
[I] := G(f, x, z, νx, νz) +G(f, x, z, ̺x, ̺z)− 2E
= α(z) [f(x+ νx, z + νz) + f(x+ ̺x, z + ̺z)− 2E]
+ β(x)
[
−
∫
Bνzε
f(x+ Pνz ,−νxh, z + h)dLn−1(h)
+−
∫
B̺zε
f(x+ P̺z ,−̺xh, z + h)dLn−1(h)− 2E
]
+ (α(x) − α(z))
[
−
∫
Bνzε
f(x+ νx, z + h)dLn−1(h)
+−
∫
B̺zε
f(x+ ̺x, z + h)dLn−1(h)− 2E
]
.
(38)
For simplicity, we decompose the previous expression into three terms to be exam-
ined separately, i.e.,
[I] = α(z)[II]+ β(x)[III] + (α(x) − α(z))[IV]. (39)
Then by (34), we have
[II] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−1 [(νx − νz)V + (̺x − ̺z)V ]
+ 2〈x+ z, (νx + νz) + (̺x + ̺z)〉
+
1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2
{
(γ − 1) [(νx − νz)2V + (̺x − ̺z)2V ]
+
[
|(νx − νz)V ⊥ |2 + |(̺x − ̺z)V ⊥ |2
] }
.
(40)
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Note that the first order terms in [III] vanishes when we integrate over the ball.
Therefore, we can estimate
[III] ≤ 1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ·
·
{
−
∫
Bνzε
[
(γ − 1)(h− Pνz ,−νxh)2V + |(h− Pνz ,−νxh)V ⊥ |2
]
dLn−1(h)
+−
∫
B̺zε
[
(γ − 1)(h− P̺z ,−̺xh)2V + |(h− P̺z ,−̺xh)V ⊥ |2
]
dLn−1(h)
}
.
(41)
In addition, it holds
[IV] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−1 (νx + ̺x)V + 2〈x+ z, νx + ̺x〉
+
1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ·
·
{
−
∫
Bνzε
[
(γ − 1)(νx − h)2V + |(νx − h)V ⊥ |2
]
dLn−1(h)
+−
∫
B̺zε
[
(γ − 1)(̺x − h)2V + |(̺x − h)V ⊥ |2
]
dLn−1(h)
}
.
(42)
We distinguish between two cases depending on the value of (νx − νz)2V and fix
τ0 < τ < 1 with 0 < τ0 < 1 defined later.
a) Case |(νx − νz)V | ≥ (τ+1)ε: In this case, we choose ̺x = −νx and ̺z = −νz. By
replacing these vectors in the inequalities [II], [III] and [IV] and using symmetry,
we obtain
[II] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−2
[
(γ − 1)(νx − νz)2V + |(νx − νz)V ⊥ |2
]
,
[III] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−2−
∫
Bνzε
|(h− Pνz ,−νxh)V ⊥ |2 dLn−1(h),
[IV] ≤ Cγ |x−z|γ−2
[
(γ−1)−
∫
Bνzε
(νx−h)2V dLn−1(h)+−
∫
Bνzε
|(νx−h)V ⊥ |2 dLn−1(h)
]
.
We used γ − 1 < 0 and the choice Pνz ,−νx = P−νz ,νx in the estimate for [III]. By
assumption, it holds (νx − νz)2V ≥ (τ + 1)2ε2 implying
|(νx − νz)V ⊥ |2 ≤
[
4− (τ + 1)2] ε2.
Thus, we need to obtain uniform bounds for the terms (νx−h)2V , |(νx − h)V ⊥ |2 and
|(h− Pνz ,−νxh)V ⊥ |2 for h ∈ Bνzε .
The assumption |(νx − νz)V | ≥ (τ+1)ε, together with |νx|, |νz| ≤ ε and Pythago-
ras’ theorem, implies{
τε ≤ |(νx)V | ≤ ε, 0 ≤ |(νx)V ⊥ | ≤
√
1− τ2 ε,
τε ≤ |(νz)V | ≤ ε, 0 ≤ |(νz)V ⊥ | ≤
√
1− τ2 ε. (43)
Moreover, the same facts yield
|(νx + νz)V | ≤ (1− τ)ε and |(νx + νz)V ⊥ | ≤ 2
√
1− τ2 ε.
By combining these and using Pythagoras’ theorem, we get
|νx + νz| <
√
8
√
1− τ ε, (44)
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since τ < 1. Let h ∈ Bνzε . Then, we have
0 = 〈h, νz〉 = hV (νz)V + 〈hV ⊥ , (νz)V ⊥〉
implying
hV = −〈hV ⊥ , (νz)V ⊥〉
(νz)V
.
In addition by applying this equality together with (43) and |hV ⊥ | ≤ |h| ≤ ε, we
obtain
|hV | ≤ ε
τ
√
1− τ2.
Consequently, we get the estimates
(νx − h)V ≥
(
τ −
√
1− τ2
τ
)
ε (45)
and
|(νx − h)V ⊥ | ≤ |(νx)V ⊥ |+ |hV ⊥ | ≤
(
1 +
√
1− τ2
)
ε. (46)
We can assume that τ0 is close enough to 1 guaranteeing the positivity of the
quantity τ − τ−1√1− τ2. In order to obtain the last estimate needed, we recall
that Pνz ,−νx is any rotation sending the vector νz to −νx. In particular, we choose
a rotation satisfying
|h− Pνz ,−νxh| ≤ |νz − Pνz ,−νxνz| = |νz + νx|
for every |h| ≤ ε. Hence by recalling (44), we get
|(h− Pνz,−νxh)V ⊥ |2 ≤ 8(1− τ)ε2. (47)
By replacing the estimates (45), (46) and (47) in [II], [III] and [IV], we can
calculate
[II] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2 [(γ − 1)(τ + 1)2 + 4− (τ + 1)2] ,
[III] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2 [8(1− τ)] ,
[IV] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2
(γ − 1)(τ − √1− τ2
τ
)2
+
(
1 +
√
1− τ2
)2 .
In addition by (39), we get
[I] ≤ [V] · Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2,
where [V] is equal to
(γ − 1)
α(z)(τ + 1)2 + (α(x) − α(z))(τ − √1− τ2
τ
)2
+ (α(x) − α(z))(1 +
√
1− τ2 )2 + α(z) [(4− (τ + 1)2)] + β(x) 8(1− τ).
The assumption on γ in (24) implies that we can choose τ0 := τ0(κ) < 1 close
enough to 1 such that the previous expression is negative, i.e.,
[V] < (γ − 1)(4α(z) + α(x) − α(z))+ α(x) − α(z) + καmax
< 4
(
γαmax − αmin
)
+ καmax
< 0.
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Now, by recalling (38), we have
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) +G(f, x, z, ωx, ωz)− 2f(x, z)
≤ 8ε2 + (20 + [V] · Cγ) |x− z|γ−2 ε2.
By choosing C > 1 large enough, we obtain
(20 + [V] · Cγ) |x− z|γ−2 ε2 < −108 |x− z|γ−2 ε2 < −107ε2.
This estimate yields
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) +G(f, x, z, ωx, ωz)− 2f(x, z) < 0.
b) Case |(νx − νz)V | ≤ (τ +1)ε: In this case, the first order terms in (34) imply the
result. By choosing ̺x = −ε x−z|x−z| and ̺z = ε x−z|x−z| in V and utilizing these in (40),
(41) and (42), we get
[II] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−1 [(νx − νz)V − 2ε] + 2〈x+ z, νx + νz〉
+
1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2
{
(γ − 1) [(νx − νz)2V + 4ε2]+ |(νx − νz)V ⊥ |2} ,
[III] ≤ 1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ·
·
{
−
∫
Bνzε
[
(γ − 1)(h− Pνz ,−νxh)2V + |(h− Pνz ,−νxh)V ⊥ |2
]
dLn−1(h)
}
and
[IV] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−1 [(νx)V − ε] + 2〈x+ z, νx − ε x− z|x− z| 〉
+
1
2
Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ·
{
−
∫
Bνzε
[
(γ − 1)(νx − h)2V + |(νx − h)V ⊥ |2
]
dLn−1(h)
+ (γ − 1)ε2 +−
∫
Bx−zε
|h|2 dLn−1(h)
}
.
The second order terms in these inequalities can be estimated above by
3Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2.
In addition, we deduce that (νx − νz)V <
[
1 +
(
τ+1
2
)2]
ε. Therefore, we have
[II] ≤ Cγ |x− z|γ−1
[(
τ + 1
2
)2
− 1
]
ε+ 4 |x+ z| ε+ 3Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2,
[III] ≤ 3Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2,
[IV] ≤ 4 |x+ z| ε+ 3Cγ |x− z|γ−2 ε2.
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By combining all these and recalling (38) and (39), we get
G(f, x, z, νx, νz) +G(f, x, z, ̺x, ̺z)− 2f(x, z)
≤ Cα(z)γ |x− z|γ−1
[(
τ + 1
2
)2
− 1
]
ε+ 4α(x) |x+ z| ε+ 8ε2
+ (20 + 3Cγ) |x− z|γ−2 ε2
≤ Cα(z)γ |x− z|γ−1
[(
τ + 1
2
)2
− 1
]
ε+ 8ε2 +
(
γ +
2
C
)
γ |x− z|γ−1 ε
≤ γ |x− z|γ−1 ε
{
γ + 1+ Cαmin
[(
τ + 1
2
)2
− 1
]}
+ 8ε2.
As in the previous case, we can choose the constant C > 1 large enough to ensure
the negativity of the previous equation. Thus, the proof is complete.
5. Regularity near the boundary. In this section, we show that the value func-
tion of the game is also asymptotically continuous near the boundary, if we assume
some regularity on the boundary of the set. The proof is based on finding a suit-
able barrier function and a strategy for the other player so that the process under
the barrier function is super- or submartingale depending on the form of the func-
tion. Then, the result follows by analyzing the barrier function and iterating the
argument.
Fix r > 0 and z ∈ Rn and define a barrier function
v(x) = a|x− z|σ + b (48)
for all x ∈ Rn \ Br(z) with some constants σ < 0, a < 0 and b ≥ 0. Recall the
auxiliary function W defined in (4). First, we prove the following properties of the
function v.
Lemma 5.1. Let r > 0 and z ∈ Rn and define the function v as in (48) with
constants a < 0, b ≥ 0 and σ < 0. Then, there is a constant C > 0 such that
sup
|ν|=ε
W (v;x, ν) ≤W
(
v;x, ε
x− z
|x− z|
)
+ Cε3 (49)
and
W
(
v;x, ε
x− z
|x− z|
)
+W
(
v;x,−ε x− z|x− z|
)
< 2v(x) + ε2aσ|x − z|σ−2
(
β(x) + α(x)(σ − 1)
)
+ Cε3
(50)
for all ε > 0 and x ∈ Rn \Br(z).
Proof. To establish the result, we apply Taylor’s formula to the function v. The
function v is real-analytic so we obtain by Taylor’s formula
v(x + h) = v(x) +
〈∇v(x), h〉 + 1
2
〈
D2v(x)h, h
〉
+O(|h|3)
= v(x)+
1
2
aσ|x−z|σ−2
(
2〈x−z, h〉+|h|2+(σ−2) 〈h, x−z〉
2
|x−z|2
)
+O(|h|3)
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for all h ∈ Rn. Let C > 0 be big enough so that ∣∣O(|h|3)∣∣ ≤ Cε3 for all |h| ≤ ε.
The function v is radially increasing, and the average integral over the first order
term of v vanishes. In addition, we have∫
Bx−zε
〈h, x− z〉2dLn−1(h) = 0.
Thus, Taylor’s formula proves the equation (49).
Next, we prove the equation (50). Recall the notations V = span{x− z} and the
orthogonal complement V ⊥. For a vector h ∈ V such that h = (x− z)ε/|x− z|, we
get
v(x + h) ≤ v(x) + 1
2
aσ|x− z|σ−2
(
2|x− z|ε+ ε2(σ − 1)
)
+ Cε3.
Therefore, we obtain
v(x + h) + v(x − h) ≤ 2v(x) + ε2aσ(σ − 1)|x− z|σ−2 + Cε3. (51)
Also, for any vector y ∈ Bz−xε , we have 〈y, x−z〉 = 0. Hence, by a short calculation,
we have∫
Bx−zε
v(x+ y) dLn−1(y) ≤ v(x) + Cε3 + 1
2
aσ|x− z|σ−2
∫
Bx−zε
|y| dLn−1(y)
= v(x) + Cε3 +
1
2
aσ|x− z|σ−2ε2
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)
.
Thus, this inequality together with Bz−xε = B
x−z
ε and (51) implies
W
(
v;x, ε
x− z
|x− z|
)
+W
(
v;x,−ε x− z|x− z|
)
= α(x)
(
v
(
x− ε x− z|x− z|
)
+ v
(
x+ ε
x− z
|x− z|
))
+ 2β(x)
∫
Bz−xε
v(x+ h˜) dLn−1(h˜)
≤ 2v(x) + ε2aσ|x− z|σ−2
(
β(x) + α(x)(σ − 1)
)
+ 2Cε3.
Next, we prove the main theorem of this section. To get the result, we need to
assume some regularity on the boundary of the set Ω.
Boundary Regularity Condition. There are universal constants r0, s ∈ (0, 1)
such that for all r ∈ (0, r0] and y ∈ ∂Ω there exists a ball
Bsr(z) ⊂ Br(y) \ Ω
for some z ∈ Br(y) \ Ω.
Assume that the set Ω satisfies this boundary condition. Then, the following
theorem holds.
Theorem 5.2. Let y ∈ ∂Ω and r ∈ (0, r0] with r0 ∈ (0, 1) and the ball Bsr(z) ⊂
Br(y) \ Ω given by the boundary regularity condition. Let u be the solution to (1)
with continuous boundary data F . Then for all η > 0, there exist ε0 > 0 and k ≥ 1
such that
u(x0)− sup
B4r(z)∩Γε,ε
F < η (52)
for all 0 < ε < ε0 < 1 and x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩ Ωε.
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Proof. The idea is to find a suitable barrier function so that by Lemma 5.1, if PI
pulls towards the point z ∈ Br(y) \Ω, the game process inside the barrier function
is a supermartingale. Then by utilizing the properties of the barrier function, we
get the result by iteration.
Choose a constant 0 < θ < 1, independent of r, such that
θ :=
sσ − 2σ
sσ − 4σ
with the parameter s > 0 from the boundary condition and a parameter σ < 0 that
will be defined later. We extend the function F continuously to the set Γ1,1 and use
the same notation for the extension. Then, we choose k ≥ 1 big enough such that
θk
(
sup
Γ1,1
F − inf
Γ1,1
F
)
< η.
In addition, we denote the constants
bU := sup
Γε,ε
F
and
b4r := sup
B4r(z)∩Γε,ε
F.
Thus for the chosen k, independent of ε, it holds
θk
(
bU − b4r
)
< η. (53)
We define a function vk such that
vk(x) = a|x− z|σ + b
in B42−kr(z) \ B41−ksr(z). The constants a ≤ 0 and b ≥ 0 can be calculated from
the boundary values
vk =
{
b4r + θ
k−1
(
bU − b4r
)
on ∂B42−kr(z)
b4r on ∂B41−ksr(z).
(54)
If bU = b4r, it holds a = 0 and b = bU . Otherwise, the values are a < 0 and b ≥ 0.
We consider the case with a < 0, since the proof of the other case is clear.
We extend the function vk to the set R
n\B41−ksr−2ε(z) and use the same notation
for the extension. We may assume that x0 ∈ Ω, and observe that
x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩ Ω ⊂ Ω ∩B2·41−kr(z) \B41−ksr(z). (55)
Assume that PII plays the game by pulling towards the point z given a turn, i.e.,
he moves the game token by the vector −ε(xm − z)/|xm − z|, if he wins the mth
toss. This strategy is denoted by S∗II. Also, fix a strategy for PI and denote it by
SI.
By using Lemma 5.1 for all m ≥ 1, we can estimate
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
vk(xm+1)|x0, . . . , xm
]
≤ 1− δ(xm)
2
(
sup
|ν|=ε
W (vk;xm, ν) +W
(
vk;xm,−ε xm − z|xm − z|
))
+ δ(xm)F (xm)
≤ 1− δ(xm)
2
(
2vk(xm) + ε
2aσ|xm − z|σ−2·
· (β(xm) + α(xm)(σ − 1))+ 2Cε3)+ δ(xm)F (xm)
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for some C > 0. Next, we need to choose the constant σ < 0 small enough. Recall
that αmin > 0. Let us fix the value
σ :=
2
αmin
(αmin − 1)
implying
β(xm) + α(xm)(σ − 1) < −1
for all xm ∈ Ω. In addition, we have
aσ|xm − z|σ−2 > aσ
(
diam(Ω) + 1
)σ−2
> 0
for all xm ∈ Ω. Thus by choosing ε0 := ε0(αmin, r,Ω, k) > 0 small enough, we can
ensure that
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[vk(xm+1)|x0, . . . , xm] ≤
(
1− δ(xm)
)
vk(xm) + δ(xm)F (xm) ≤ vk(xm)
for all ε < ε0. We have shown that the process
Mm := vk(xm)
is a supermartingale, when PII uses the strategy S∗II and PI uses any strategy SI.
Define a boundary function Fvk : Γε,ε → R such that
Fvk = vk|Γε,ε .
By Theorem 3.7, we have u = uI with uI the value function for PI defined in (8).
Since F ≤ Fvk , (Mm)∞m=1 is a supermartingale, Fvk is bounded and τ <∞ almost
surely, we can estimate with the help of the optimal stopping theorem
u(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[
F (xτ )
] ≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
F (xτ )
]
≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S∗II
[
Fvk(xτ )
] ≤ vk(x0).
By using the boundary values (54), we can calculate the constants a and b in the
function vk and deduce by (55) that
vk(x0) ≤ b4r + θk
(
bU − b4r
)
.
Hence by (53), we have shown the estimate (52).
Corollary 5.3. Let η > 0 and let u be the solution to (1) with continuous boundary
data F . Then, there is a constant r ∈ (0, r0] such that for all r ∈ (0, r] there exist
constants k ≥ 1 and ε0 > 0 such that for any y ∈ Γε,ε it holds
u(x0)− F (y) < η
for all ε < ε0 and x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩Ωε.
Proof. First, assume that y ∈ ∂Ω. Theorem 5.2 implies that for any r ∈ (0, r0],
there are constants k ≥ 1 and ε0 > 0 such that
u(x0)− sup
B4r(z)∩Γε,ε
F <
η
10
for all ε < ε0 and x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩Ωε. Let y∗ ∈ B4r(z) ∩ Γε,ε be such that
sup
B4r(z)∩Γε,ε
F < F (y∗) +
η
10
.
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The boundary function F is continuous on the compact set Γε,ε, so there is a
modulus of continuity ωF for the function F . Thus, we can estimate
u(x0)− F (y) = uε(x0)− F (y∗) + F (y∗)− F (y)
< u− sup
B4r(z)∩Γε,ε
F +
η
10
+ ωF
(|y∗ − y|)
<
η
5
+ ωF
(|y∗ − y|).
It holds |z − y| < r implying the estimate |y∗ − y| ≤ |y∗ − z| + |z − y| < 5r. We
choose r > 0 so small that
ωF (5r) <
η
10
for all r < r. This yields that for any r < r, we have
u(x0)− F (y) < η
2
for all ε < ε0 and x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩Ωε.
Next, assume that y 6∈ ∂Ω. Pick a point yb ∈ ∂Ω such that y ∈ Bε(yb). We
choose ε0 > 0 so small that
ωF (ε0) <
η
2
.
This implies that ∣∣F (y)− F (yb)∣∣ ≤ ωF (|y − yb|) < η
2
for all ε < ε0. Since yb ∈ ∂Ω, we can use the estimates above to get the result.
Remark 5.4. By using a similar argument to Theorem 5.2, it holds for all y ∈ ∂Ω
and η > 0 that there exist ε0 > 0 and k ≥ 1 such that
u(x0)− inf
B4r(z)∩Γε,ε
F > −η
for all 0 < ε < ε0 < 1 and x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩ Ωε. Hence, we have for all r > 0 small
enough, k ≥ 1 big enough and ε > 0 small enough the lower bound
u(x0)− F (y) > −η
for y ∈ Γε,ε and x0 ∈ B41−kr(y) ∩Ωε.
6. Application. In this section, we prove that the uniform limit of functions sat-
isfying (1) as ε→ 0 is a weak solution to the normalized homogeneous p(x)-Laplace
equation
∆Np(x)u(x) := ∆u(x) +
(
p(x)− 2)∆N∞u(x)
= ∆u(x)−∆N∞u(x) +
(
p(x)− 1)∆N∞u(x)
= 0.
(56)
This equation is in a non divergence form so we define weak solutions via viscos-
ity theory. There is a related version of the equation (56), called a strong p(x)-
Laplacian, in a divergence form, which has recently received attention and studied
using distributional weak theory (see for example [1, 23, 17]). For some questions,
the viscosity point of view is very natural in the sense that the equation (56) has
the Pucci operator bounds used for example in Section 4 in [3].
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We define for all vectors x, h ∈ Rn and symmetric n× n matrices X
Fp(x)(x, h,X) := trace(X)−
n∑
i,j
hihj
|h|2 Xij +
(
p(x)− 1) n∑
i,j
hihj
|h|2 Xij .
These functions are discontinuous, when h = 0. Therefore, we define viscosity
solutions via semicontinuous extensions. For more details about the extensions, see
for example [5, 4]. We denote by λmin(X) and by λmax(X) the smallest and the
largest eigenvalues of a symmetric matrix X .
Definition 6.1. A continuous function u : Ω → R is a viscosity solution to the
equation (56), if for all x ∈ Ω and φ ∈ C2 such that u(x) = φ(x) and u(y) > φ(y)
for y 6= x we have{
0 ≥ Fp(x)(x,∇φ(x), D2φ(x)), if ∇φ(x) 6= 0,
0 ≥ λmin((p(x) − 2)D2φ(x)) + trace(D2φ(x)), if ∇φ(x) = 0. (57)
We also require that for all x ∈ Ω and φ ∈ C2 such that u(x) = φ(x) and u(y) < φ(y)
for y 6= x all the inequalities are reversed, and we use λmax in the role of λmin.
It is equivalent to require that u− φ has a local strict minimum at x instead of
u(x) = φ(x) and u(y) > φ(y) for y 6= x (see for example [9]). Next, we prove that
by passing to a subsequence if necessary, the value function of the game converges
uniformly to a solution of the equation (56). To prove that the limiting function u
is a viscosity solution to (56), we use an argument similar to the stability principle
for viscosity solutions. We apply the DPP (1) for a test function φ ∈ C2 and deduce
the connection by utilizing the uniform convergence.
Theorem 6.2. Let uε denote the unique continuous solution to (1) with ε > 0 and
with a continuous boundary function F : Γε,ε → R. Then, there are a function
u : Ω→ R and a subsequence {εi} such that uεi converges uniformly to u on Ω and
the function u is a viscosity solution to (56) with the boundary data F .
Proof. To find the function u, we use a variant of the Arzela`-Ascoli’s theorem (see
for example [16, p. 15-16]). By Theorems 4.1 and 5.2 together with Remark 5.4,
the assumptions for Arzela`-Ascoli’s theorem are satisfied and hence, there exist a
continuous function u on Ω with the boundary values F and a subsequence {εi}
such that uεi → u uniformly on Ω as i→ ∞. Thus, it is enough to show that u is
a viscosity solution to (56).
Let x ∈ Ω and φ ∈ C2 such that u − φ has a strict local minimum at x. Then,
we have
inf
Br(x)
(u− φ) = u(x)− φ(x) < u(z)− φ(z)
for some r > 0 and for all z ∈ Br(x) \ {x}. The uniform convergence yields
inf
Br(x)
(uε − φ) < uε(z)− φ(z)
for all z ∈ Br(x)\{x} and for all ε > 0 small enough. Thus, we can use the definition
of the infimum and deduce that for all ηε > 0, there exists a point xε ∈ Br(x) ⊂ Ω
such that
uε(xε)− φ(xε) ≤ uε(z)− φ(z) + ηε
for all z ∈ Br(x) and ε > 0 small enough with xε → x as ε → 0. We define
ϕ := φ+ uε(xε)− φ(xε) so that
ϕ(xε) = uε(xε) and uε(z) ≥ ϕ(z)− ηε
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for all z ∈ Br(x). Therefore, these together with the fact that uε is a solution to
(1) imply
uε(xε) = Tεuε(xε) ≥ Tεϕ(xε)− (1− δ(xε))ηε
= Tεφ(xε)− ηε + uε(xε)− φ(xε) + δ(xε)Λε,
where we use the monotonicity of Tε and denote Λε := ηε + φ(xε) − uε(xε). This
inequality yields
ηε ≥ Tεφ(xε)− φ(xε) + δ(xε)Λε. (58)
By the Taylor’s expansion of φ at xε with |ν| = 1, we get
1
2
φ(xε + εν) +
1
2
φ(xε − εν) = φ(xε) + ε
2
2
〈D2φ(xε)ν, ν〉+ o(ε2), (59)
−
∫
Bνε
φ(xε + h)dLn−1(h) = φ(xε) + ε
2
2(n+ 1)
∆ν⊥φ(xε) + o(ε
2). (60)
In (60), we utilize the orthonormal basis V including ν and an orthonormal basis
for ν⊥ to obtain
1
2
−
∫
Bνε
〈D2φ(xε)h, h〉dLn−1(h) = ε
2
2(n+ 1)
∆ν⊥φ(xε)
in a similar way to [15]. Here, the operator ∆ν⊥ denotes the Laplacian on the plane
ν⊥, i.e.,
∆ν⊥φ(xε) =
n∑
j=2
〈D2φ(xε)νj , νj〉
with ν2, . . . , νn the orthonormal basis vectors for ν
⊥. Observe that
∆φ(z) = trace(D2φ(z)) = ∆ν⊥φ(z) + 〈D2φ(z)ν, ν〉 (61)
for any |ν| = 1 and z ∈ Ω. To see this, we apply the orthonormal basis V and a
change of variables x1 = ν, x2 = ν2, . . . , xn = νn. Then, we deduce the equation
(61) by the chain rule.
There exists a vector νmin := νmin(ε) minimizing
α(xε)φ(xε + εν) + β(xε)−
∫
Bνε
φ(xε + h)dLn−1(h) (62)
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with |ν| = 1. Thus by (59) and (60) with ν = νmin and the fact that −ν⊥ ≡ ν⊥, we
obtain
Tεφ(xε) =
1− δ(xε)
2
sup
|ν|=1
(
α(xε)φ(xε + εν) + β(xε)−
∫
Bνε
φ(xε + h)dLn−1(h)
)
+
1− δ(xε)
2
inf
|ν|=1
(
α(xε)φ(xε + εν) + β(xε)−
∫
Bνε
φ(xε + h)dLn−1(h)
)
+ δ(xε)F (xε)
≥(1− δ(xε))α(xε)
2
{φ(xε + ενmin) + φ(xε − ενmin)}
+ (1− δ(xε))β(xε)−
∫
B
νmin
ε
φ(xε + h)dLn−1(h) + δ(xε)F (xε) + o(ε2)
=(1− δ(xε))φ(xε) + (1 − δ(xε)) β(xε)ε
2
2(n+ 1)
{
∆ν⊥minφ(xε)
+ (p(xε)− 1)〈D2φ(xε)νmin, νmin〉
}
+ δ(xε)F (xε) + o(ε
2).
By this estimate and (58), we have
ηε ≥ − φ(xε) + (1 − δ(xε))
{
φ(xε) +
β(xε)ε
2
2(n+ 1)
[
∆ν⊥minφ(xε)
+ (p(xε)− 1)〈D2φ(xε)νmin, νmin〉
]}
+ δ(xε)
(
F (xε) + Λε
)
+ o(ε2).
(63)
First, assume that |∇φ(x)| 6= 0. Then by xε → x as ε→ 0, it turns out that
νmin → − ∇φ(x)|∇φ(x)| =: ν
∗
min (64)
as ε→ 0. Here, we need the fact that αmin > 0, i.e., pmin > 1. In addition by (61),
we have
∆(ν∗min)⊥φ(x) + (p(x) − 1)〈D2φ(x)ν∗min, ν∗min〉 = ∆Np(x)φ(x). (65)
Choose ηε = o(ε
2), divide both sides in (63) by ε2 and let ε→ 0. Therefore by (63),
(64), (65) and the facts that xε → x and δ(xε)ε−2 → 0 as ε→ 0, we obtain
0 ≥ β(x)
2(n+ 1)
∆Np(x)φ(x).
By β(x) ≥ βmin > 0, we get the inequality ∆Np(x)φ(x) ≤ 0.
Next, assume that |∇φ(x)| = 0. By (61), we have
∆ν⊥minφ(xε) + (p(xε)− 1)〈D
2φ(xε)νmin, νmin〉
= ∆φ(x) + (p(xε)− 2)〈D2φ(xε)νmin, νmin〉.
(66)
Assume that p(x) > 2. Then by the continuity of p and xε → x as ε→ 0, we have
p(xε) > 2 for all ε small enough. Thus, we can estimate
(p(xε)− 2)〈D2φ(xε)νmin, νmin〉 ≥ (p(xε)− 2)λmin(D2φ(xε))
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for all ε small enough. As above, this estimate together with (63), (66) and the
continuity of z 7→ λmin(D2φ(z)) imply
0 ≥ ∆φ(x) + λmin((p(x) − 2)D2φ(x)).
The cases p(x) = 2 and p(x) < 2 can be treated in a similar fashion.
To show the required reverse inequality, we choose |νmax| = 1 such that it maxi-
mizes (62), and we consider the reverse inequality with φ ∈ C2 such that u− φ has
a strict maximum at x. The proof is analogous to the above.
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